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Abstract—We investigate the connectivity of a wireless sensor
network secured by the heterogeneous key predistribution scheme
under an independent on/off channel model. The heterogeneous
scheme induces an inhomogeneous random key graph, denoted by
K(n;µ,K, P ) and the on/off channel model induces an Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi graph, denoted by H(n, α). Hence, the overall random
graph modeling the WSN is obtained by the intersection of
K(n;µ,K, P ) and H(n, α). We present conditions on how to
scale the parameters of the intersecting graph with respect to
the network size n such that the graph i) has no isolated nodes
and ii) is connected, both with high probability as the number
of nodes gets large. Our results are supported by a simulation
study demonstrating that i) despite their asymptotic nature, our
results can in fact be useful in designing finite-node wireless
sensor networks so that they achieve secure connectivity with
high probability; and ii) despite the simplicity of the on/off
communication model, the probability of connectivity in the
resulting wireless sensor network approximates very well the case
where the disk model is used.
Index Terms—Wireless Sensor Networks, Security, Inhomoge-
neous Random Key Graphs, Connectivity.
1. INTRODUCTION
A. Wireless Sensor Networks and Security
W IRELESS sensor networks (WSNs) emerged as anenabling platform for a broad range of application
areas owing to their low-cost, low-power, small size, and
adaptability to the physical environment [1]. These unique
features triggered the proliferation and adoption of WSNs in
several domains including military, health, and environment,
but also gave rise to unique security challenges that can not be
tackled using classical security mechanisms [2]. In particular,
asymmetric cryptosystems provide a scalable solution for
securing large scale WSNs; however, they are generally slow
and lead to excessive energy and memory consumption. On
the other hand, symmetric cryptosystems were shown to be
superior in terms of speed and energy efficiency, but they
demand novel and efficient mechanisms for key-establishment
among sensor nodes [3], [4]. In principle, an efficient key-
establishment mechanism should result in a securely connected
topology, i.e., a network where there exists a secure commu-
nication path (possibly multihop) between every pair of nodes
allowing the exchange of data and control messages, while
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conforming to the typical limitations of WSNs. Also, it shall
not assume knowledge of post-deployment configuration, since
in most cases WSNs are deployed randomly in large numbers.
In their seminal work, Eschenauer and Gligor proposed
a random key predistribution protocol as a practical and
efficient method for key-establishment in large scale WSNs
[3]. Their scheme, hereafter referred to as the EG scheme,
operates as follows: before deployment, each node is given
a random set of K cryptographic keys, selected uniformly
(without replacement) from a large key pool of size P . After
deployment, two nodes can communicate securely over an
existing channel if they share at least one key. The EG
scheme is currently regarded as one of the most feasible
solutions for key-establishment among sensor nodes, e.g., see
[5, Chapter 13], [6], and references therein, and has led
the way to several other variants, including the q-composite
scheme [4], the random pairwise scheme [4], and many others.
The EG scheme inherently assumes that all nodes are
homogeneous in terms of their roles and capabilities, hence
they are assigned the same number K of keys. However,
emerging WSN applications are complex and are envisioned
to require the coexistence of different classes of nodes with
different roles and capabilities [7]. For instance, a particular
class of nodes may act as cluster heads that are used to
connect several clusters of nodes together. These cluster heads
need to communicate with a large number of nodes in their
vicinity and they are also expected to be more powerful than
regular nodes. Thus, one can reasonably argue that more keys
should be given to the cluster heads to ensure high levels of
connectivity and security.
To cope with the expected heterogeneity in WSN topologies,
Yag˘an proposed a new variation of the EG scheme, referred
to as the heterogeneous random key predistribution scheme
[8]. The heterogeneous scheme considers the case when the
network includes sensors with varying levels of resources,
features, security, or connectivity requirements. The scheme is
described as follows. Given r classes, each sensor is indepen-
dently classified as a class-i node with probability µi > 0 for
each i = 1, . . . , r. Then, sensors in class-i are each assigned
Ki keys selected uniformly at random from a key pool of
size P . Similar to the EG scheme, nodes that share at least
one common key (regardless of their class) can communicate
securely over an available channel after deployment.
Given the randomness involved in the EG scheme and the
heterogeneous scheme, there is a positive probability that a
pair of nodes may have no common key, thus can not establish
2a secure communication link in between. Moreover, two nodes
that share a key may not have a wireless channel in between
(possibly because of the limited transmission radius). Hence,
it is natural to ask whether the resulting network would be
securely connected or not. Specifically, two nodes are securely
connected if they share a key and have a communication
channel in between. A network is said to be connected if
there is a path between every pair of vertices. In essence, one
needs to know if it is possible to control the parameters of the
scheme (possibly as functions of the network size n), such
that the resulting network is connected with high probability.
In [8], Yag˘an considered a WSN secured by the heteroge-
neous scheme under full-visibility assumption, i.e., all pairs
of sensors have a communication channel in between, hence
the only condition for two nodes to be connected is to share
a key. Therein, they established scaling conditions on the
parameters of the heterogeneous scheme as functions of the
network size n such that the resulting network is connected
with high probability as the number of nodes gets large. In
particular, they considered a random graph model naturally
induced by the heterogeneous scheme and established scaling
conditions on the model parameters such that the resulting
graph is connected with high probability as the number of
nodes gets large. Specifically, with K = {K1,K2, . . . ,Kr},
µ = {µ1, µ2, . . . , µr}, and n denoting the network size, we
let K(n;µ,K, P ) denote the random graph induced by the
heterogeneous key predistribution scheme, where any pair of
vertices are adjacent as long as they share a key. This model
was referred to as the inhomogeneous random key graph in
[8], where zero-one laws for absence of isolated nodes and
connectivity were established. The inhomogeneous random
key graph models the shared-key connectivity of the WSN
under the heterogeneous scheme.
Our paper is motivated by the fact that the full-visibility
assumption is not likely to hold in real-world implementations
of WSNs. In particular, the randomness of the wireless channel
as well as limited transmission ranges would severely limit
the availability of wireless channels between nodes, rendering
two nodes disconnected even when they share a key. In fact,
as wireless connectivity comes into play, an essential question
arises: Under a given model for wireless connectivity, is it
possible to control the parameters of the heterogeneous scheme
to ensure that the resulting network is connected?
B. Modeling Wireless Connectivity
Our paper aims to answer this question, hence bridging
the disconnect between the model developed in [8] and real
world implementations of WSNs where wireless channels are
scarce and the full-visibility assumption does not hold. In
particular, we model the wireless connectivity of the WSN, say
using a (possibly random) graph I(n; ·), whose edges represent
pairs of sensors who have a wireless communication channel
available in between. The overall model of the WSN will then
be an intersection of K(n;µ,K, P ) and I(n; ·) since a pair
of sensors can establish a secure communication link if they
share a key and have a wireless channel available. Let G be
the intersecting graph, i.e., G := K(n;µ,K, P )∩ I(n; ·). At a
high level, our objective is to establish scaling conditions on
the parameters of G such that the resulting graph is connected
with high probability as the number of nodes gets large.
In practice, limited transmission range of sensors signifi-
cantly impacts the wireless connectivity of a WSN, hence the
disk model [9] can be seen as a good candidate model for
wireless connectivity among sensor nodes. The disk model
is described as follows. Assuming that nodes are distributed
over a bounded region D of a euclidean plane, nodes vi and
vj located at xi and xj , respectively, are able to commu-
nicate if ‖xi − xj‖ < ρ, where ρ denotes the transmission
radius. A special case of the disk model when node locations
are independently and uniformly distributed over the region
D, gives rise to the random geometric graph [10], here-
after denoted I(n; ρ). Now, let G(n;µ,K, P, ρ) be a random
graph obtained by intersecting the inhomogeneous random
key graph K(n;µ,K, P, ·) with a random geometric graph
I(n; ρ). Clearly, G(n;µ,K, P, ρ) represents a reasonably ac-
curate model for a WSN secured by the heterogeneity scheme,
where two nodes are connected if they i) share a key, and ii)
are within transmission radius.
Unfortunately, analyzing the connectivity of
G(n;µ,K, P, ρ) is likely to be very challenging, and
may very well be impossible. In fact, the Gupta-Kumar
conjecture [9] on the connectivity of H(n;α) ∩ I(n; ρ)
where H(n;α) represents an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) graph, took
many years (and several attempts) to be resolved eventually
by Penrose [11]; see [12] for a detailed discussion on the
difficulties involved in analyzing intersection of different
types of graphs. The model K(n;µ,K, P ) considered here
is much more complicated than an ER graph due to edge
correlations [8], leading to the following important question:
Is there any communication model that provides a good
approximation of the classical disk model, but also allows a
comprehensive analysis of the resulting intersecting graph?
This question was answered in the affirmative in [12], [13],
where it was shown that an independent on/off channel model
provides a good approximation of the disk model for under-
standing the critical scalings of connectivity in settings similar
to ones we consider here. In the independent on/off channel
model, the wireless channel between any given pair of nodes
is either on (with probability α) or off (with probability 1−α)
independently from all other channels. The model induces an
ER graph H(n;α), where an edge exists (respectively does not
exist) between two vertices with probability α (respectively
1− α) independently from all other edges.
With these in mind, we model the wireless
connectivity of the WSN by an ER graph H(n;α)
and study the connectivity of the intersecting graph
G(n;µ,K, P, α) := K(n;µ,K, P ) ∩ H(n;α). This approach
allows us to i) establish rigorous results concerning the secure
connectivity of a WSN albeit using a simplified wireless
communication model, and ii) demonstrate via simulations
that these results still apply under the more realistic disk
model. In Section 4, we provide simulation results indicating
that the connectivity of K(n;µ,K, P ) ∩ I(n; ρ) behaves very
similar to that of K(n;µ,K, P ) ∩ H(n;α), as we match α
and ρ leading to the same probability of wireless channel
availability; i.e., α = πρ2.
3C. Contributions
We investigate the connectivity of a WSN secured by
the heterogeneous key predistribution scheme under an in-
dependent on/off channel model. The heterogeneous scheme
induces an inhomogeneous random key graph, denoted by
K(n;µ,K, P ) and the on/off channel model induces an
ER graph, denoted by H(n, α). Hence, the overall random
graph modeling the WSN is obtained by the intersection of
K(n;µ,K, P ) and H(n, α). We denote this intersection by
G(n;µ,K, P, α), i.e., G(n;µ,K, P, α) := K(n;µ,K, P ) ∩
H(n, α). We present conditions on how to scale the parameters
of G(n;µ,K, P, α) with respect to the network size n such
that i) it has no isolated nodes and ii) it is connected, both
with high probability as the number of nodes gets large. The
results are given in the form of zero-one laws with critical
scalings precisely established. This maps to dimensioning the
parameters of the heterogeneous scheme with respect to the
network size n and the channel parameter α such that the
resulting network is securely connected.
Our results are supported by a simulation study (see Section
4) demonstrating that i) despite their asymptotic nature, our
results can in fact be useful in designing finite-node WSNs so
that they achieve secure connectivity with high probability;
and ii) despite the simplicity of the on/off communication
model, the probability of connectivity in the resulting WSN
approximates very well the case where the disk model is used.
In addition, our results are shown to complement and gener-
alize several previous work in the literature (see Section 3-A
for details).
All limiting statements, including asymptotic equivalences
are considered with the number of sensor nodes n going to
infinity. The indicator function of an event E is denoted by
1[E]. We say that an event holds with high probability (whp)
if it holds with probability 1 as n → ∞. In comparing the
asymptotic behavior of the sequences {an}, {bn}, we use the
standard Landau notation, e.g., an = o(bn), an = ω(bn), an =
O(bn), an = Ω(bn), and an = Θ(bn). We also use an ∼ bn
to denote the asymptotic equivalence limn→∞ an/bn = 1.
2. THE MODEL
The heterogeneous random key predistribution scheme in-
troduced in [8] works as follows. Consider a network of n
sensors labeled as v1, v2, . . . , vn. Each sensor node is classi-
fied into one of the r classes (e.g., priority levels) according to
a probability distribution µ = {µ1, µ2, . . . , µr} with µi > 0
for i = 1, . . . , r and
∑r
i=1 µi = 1. Then, a class-i node is
assigned Ki cryptographic keys selected uniformly at random
from a key pool of size P . It follows that the key ring Σx of
node vx is a random variable (rv) with
P[Σx = S | tx = i] =
(
P
Ki
)−1
, S ∈ PKi ,
where tx denotes the class of vx and PKi is the collection
of all subsets of {1, . . . , P} with size Ki. The classical
key predistribution scheme of Eschenauer and Gligor [3]
constitutes a special case of this model with r = 1, i.e., when
all sensors belong to the same class and receive the same
number of keys; see also [14].
Let K = {K1,K2, . . . ,Kr} and assume without loss of
generality that K1 ≤ K2 ≤ . . . ≤ Kr. Consider a random
graph K induced on the vertex set V = {v1, . . . , vn} such that
a pair of nodes vx and vy are adjacent, denoted by vx ∼K vy ,
if they have at least one cryptographic key in common, i.e.,
vx ∼K vy if Σx ∩ Σy 6= ∅. (1)
The adjacency condition (1) defines the inhomogeneous
random key graph denoted byK(n;µ,K, P ) [8]. This model is
also known in the literature as the general random intersection
graph; e.g., see [15]–[17]. The probability pij that a class-i
node and a class-j node are adjacent is given by
pij = P[vx ∼K vy | tx = i, ty = j] = 1−
(
P−Ki
Kj
)(
P
Kj
) (2)
as long as Ki+Kj ≤ P ; otherwise if Ki+Kj > P , we have
pij = 1. Let λi denote the mean probability that a class-i node
is connected to another node in K(n;µ,K, P ). We have
λi = P[vx ∼K vy | tx = i] =
r∑
j=1
pijµj . (3)
We also find it useful to define the mean key ring size by
Kavg; i.e.,
Kavg =
r∑
j=1
Kjµj . (4)
We model the wireless connectivity of the WSN by means
of an independent on/off channel model. In particular, the
channel between any given pair of nodes is either on with
probability α or off with probability 1 − α. More precisely,
let {Bij(α), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n} denote i.i.d Bernoulli rvs,
each with success probability α. The communication channel
between two distinct nodes vx and vy is on (respectively, off) if
Bxy(α) = 1 (respectively, if Bxy(α) = 0). The on/off channel
model induces a standard ER graph H(n;α) [18], defined on
the vertices V = {v1, . . . , vn} such that vx and vy are adjacent,
denoted by vx ∼H vy , if Bxy(α) = 1.
We model the overall topology of a WSN by the intersec-
tion of an inhomogeneous random key graph K(n;µ,K, P )
with an ER graph H(n;α). Namely, nodes vx and vy are
adjacent in K(n;µ,K, P ) ∩ H(n;α), if and only if they
are adjacent in both K and H. Hence, the edges in the
intersection graph K(n;µ,K, P ) ∩ H(n;α) represent pairs
of sensors that can securely communicate since they have
i) a communication link available in between, and ii) a
shared cryptographic key. Therefore, studying the connectivity
properties of K(n;µ,K, P )∩H(n;α) amounts to studying the
secure connectivity of heterogeneous WSNs under the on/off
channel model.
Hereafter, we denote the intersection graph K(n;µ,K, P )∩
H(n;α) by G(n;µ,K, P, α). To simplify the notation, we let
θ = (K,P ), andΘ = (θ, α). The probability of edge existence
between a class-i node vx and a class-j node vy in G(n;Θ)
is given by
P[vx ∼G vy
∣∣∣ tx = i, ty = j]
4= P[vx ∼K vy ∩ vx ∼H vy | tx = i, ty = j]
= αpij
by independence. Similar to (3), the mean edge probability for
a class-i node in G(n;µ,Θ) as Λi is given by
Λi =
r∑
j=1
µjαpij = αλi, i = 1, . . . , r. (5)
Throughout, we assume that the number of classes r is
fixed and does not scale with n, and so are the probabilities
µ1, . . . , µr. All of the remaining parameters are assumed to
be scaled with n.
3. MAIN RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We refer to a mapping Θ = K1, . . . ,Kr, P, α : N0 →
N
r+1
0 × (0, 1) as a scaling if
1 ≤ K1,n ≤ K2,n ≤ . . . ≤ Kr,n ≤ Pn/2 (6)
for all n = 2, 3, . . .. We note that under (6), the edge
probability pij is given by (2).
A. Results
We first present a zero-one law for the absence of isolated
nodes in G(n;µ,Θn).
Theorem 3.1. Consider a probability distribution µ =
{µ1, . . . , µr} with µi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r and a scaling
Θ : N0 → Nr+10 × (0, 1) such that
Λ1(n) = αnλ1(n) ∼ c logn
n
(7)
for some c > 0. We have
lim
n→∞
P
[
G(n;µ,Θn) has
no isolated nodes
]
=
{
0 if c < 1
1 if c > 1
(8)
The scaling condition (7) will often be used in the form
Λ1(n) = cn
logn
n
, n = 2, 3, . . . (9)
with limn→∞ cn = c > 0.
Next, we present an analogous result for connectivity.
Theorem 3.2. Consider a probability distribution µ =
{µ1, . . . , µr} with µi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r and a scaling
Θ : N0 → Nr+10 × (0, 1) such that (7) holds for some c > 0.
Then, we have
lim
n→∞
P[G(n;µ,Θn) is connected] =
{
0 if c < 1
1 if c > 1
(10)
under the additional conditions that
Pn ≥ σn, n = 1, 2, . . . (11)
for some σ > 0 and
p11(n) = ω
(
1
nαn
)
. (12)
The resemblance of the results presented in Theorem 3.1
and Theorem 3.2 indicates that absence of isolated nodes
and connectivity are asymptotically equivalent properties for
G(n;µ,Θn). Similar observations were made for other well-
known random graph models as well; e.g., inhomogeneous
random key graphs [8], Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs [18], and (homo-
geneous) random key graphs [14].
Conditions (11) and (12) are enforced mainly for technical
reasons and they are only needed in the proof of the one-
law of Theorem 3.2. In particular, condition (11) is essential
for real-world WSN implementations in order to ensure the
resilience of the network against node capture attacks; e.g.,
see [3], [19]. For instance, assume that an adversary captures
a number of sensors, compromising all the keys that belong to
the captured nodes. If Pn = o(n), then it would be possible
for the adversary to compromise Ω(Pn) keys by capturing
only o(n) sensors (whose type does not matter in this case).
In this case, the WSN would fail to exhibit the unassailability
property [20], [21] and would be deemed as vulnerable against
adversarial attacks.
Also, condition (12) is enforced mainly for technical reasons
for the proof of the one-law to work. The need of such a lower
bound arises from the fact that our scaling condition (7) merely
scales the minimum mean edge probability, not the minimum
(or each) edge probability, as logn/n. For instance, the current
scaling condition (7) gives us an easy upper bound on the min-
imum edge probability in the network, but does not specify any
non-trivial lower bound on that probability. More specifically,
it is easy to see that αnp11(n) = O (Λ1) = O (logn/n), but it
is not clear if the sequence αnp11(n) has a non-trivial lower
bound. In fact, authors in [22] investigated the connectivity
of an inhomogeneous Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) graph, while setting
the probability of an edge connecting two nodes of classes
i and j to κ (i, j) logn/n, where κ (i, j) returns a positive
real number for each pair (i, j); i.e., each individual edge was
scaled as logn/n.
In summary, condition (11) is needed to ensure the re-
silience of the network against node capture attacks, while
condition (12) is needed to provide a non-trivial lower bound
on the minimum edge probability of the network. To provide
a concrete example, one can set Pn = n logn and have
K1,n = (logn)
1/2+ε with any ε > 0 to satisfy (12) for
any αn ≥ 1/(logn)ε (see Lemma A.1). In this case, setting
Kavg,n = logn
3/2 ensures that the resulting network is
connected whp (see Corollary 3.3).
Theorem 3.1 (resp. Theorem 3.2) states thatG(n;µ,Θn) has
no isolated node (resp. is connected) whp if the mean degree
of class-1 nodes (that receive the smallest number K1,n of
keys) is scaled as (1 + ǫ) logn for some ǫ > 0. On the other
hand, if this minimal mean degree scales as (1 − ǫ) logn for
some ǫ > 0, then whp G(n;µ,Θn) has an isolated node, and
hence not connected. These results indicate that the minimum
key ring size in the network has a significant impact on the
connectivity of G(n;µ,Θn).
The importance of the minimum key ring size on connec-
tivity can be seen more explicitly under a mild condition on
the scaling, as shown in the next corollary.
Corollary 3.3. Consider a probability distribution µ =
{µ1, . . . , µr} with µi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r and a scaling
5Θ : N0 → Nr+10 × (0, 1) such that λ1(n) = o(1) and
αn
K1,nKavg,n
Pn
∼ c logn
n
(13)
for some c > 0, where Kavg,n is as defined at (4). Then we
have the zero-one law (8) for absence of isolated nodes. If, in
addition, the conditions (11) and (12) are satisfied, then we also
have the zero-one law (10) for connectivity.
Proof. In view of (3), we see that λ1(n) = o(1) implies
p1j(n) = o(1) for j = 1, . . . , r. From Lemma A.1, this then
leads to p1j(n) ∼ K1,nKj,nPn , whence
λ1(n) =
r∑
j=1
µjp1j(n) ∼
K1,n
∑r
j=1 µjKj,n
Pn
=
K1,nKavg,n
Pn
Thus, the scaling conditions (7) and (13) are equivalent under
λ1(n) = o(1) and Corollary 3.3 follows from Theorem 3.1
and Theorem 3.2.
We see from Corollary 3.3 that for a fixed mean numberKavg,n
of keys per sensor, network connectivity is directly affected by
the minimum key ring size K1,n. For example, reducing K1,n
by half means that the smallest αn for which the network
becomes connected whp is increased by two-fold (see Figure
2 for a numerical example demonstrating this phenomenon).
B. Comparison with related work
Our main results extend the work in [8] and [23], where
authors established zero-one laws for the connectivity of a
WSN secured by the heterogeneous key predistribution scheme
under the full-visibility assumption. Although a crucial first
step in the study of heterogeneous key predistribution schemes,
the assumption that all pairs of sensors have a communication
channel in between is not likely to hold in most practical
settings. In this regard, our work extends the results in [8]
and [23] to more practical WSN scenarios where the wireless
connectivity of the network is taken into account. By setting
αn = 1 for each n = 1, 2, . . . (i.e., by assuming that all links
are available), our results reduce to those given in [8].
Authors in [12] (respectively, [24]) investigated the con-
nectivity (respectively, k-connectivity) of WSNs secured by
the classical EG scheme under an independent on/off chan-
nel model. However, when the network consists of sensors
with varying level of resources (e.g., computational, memory,
power), and with varying level of security and connectivity
requirements, it may no longer be sensible to assign the same
number of keys to all sensors. Our work addresses this issue
by generalizing [12] to the cases where nodes can be assigned
different number of keys. When r = 1, i.e., when all nodes
belong to the same class and receive the same number of keys,
our result recovers the main result in [12].
4. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We now present numerical results to support Theorems 3.1
and Theorem 3.2 in the finite node regime. Furthermore, we
show by simulations that the on/off channel model serves as
a good approximation of the disk model. In our simulations,
we fix the number of nodes at n = 500 and the size of the
key pool at P = 104.
The first step in comparing the on/off channel model to
the disk model is to propose a matching between ER graph
H(n;α) and the random geometric graph I(n; ρ) in a way that
leads to the same probability of link availability. In particular,
consider 500 nodes distributed uniformly and independently
over a folded unit square [0, 1]2 with toroidal (continuous)
boundary conditions. Since there are no border effects, we get
P [‖xi − xj‖ < ρ] = πρ2, i 6= j, i, j = 1, . . . , n
whenever ρ < 0.5. Thus, in order to match the two communi-
cation models we set α = πρ2. Recall that G(n;µ,θ, α) =
K(n;µ,θ) ∩ H(n;α), and let G˜(n;µ,θ, ρ) = K(n;µ,θ) ∩
I(n; ρ). Next, we present several simulation results comparing
the (empirical) probabilities that G and G˜ are connected,
respectively.
We start by considering the channel parameter α = πρ2 =
0.2, α = πρ2 = 0.4, α = πρ2 = 0.6, and α = πρ2 = 0.8,
while varying the parameter K1 (i.e., the smallest key ring
size) from 5 to 35. The number of classes is fixed at 2
with µ = {0.5, 0.5} and we set K2 = K1 + 5. For each
parameter pair (K,α) (respectively, (K,πρ2)), we generate
800 independent samples of the graphs G (respectively, G˜)
and count the number of times (out of a possible 800)
that the obtained graphs i) have no isolated nodes and ii)
are connected. Dividing the counts by 800, we obtain the
(empirical) probabilities for the events of interest. We observed
that G is connected whenever it has no isolated nodes yielding
the same empirical probability for both events. This is in
parallel with the asymptotic equivalence of the two properties
as implied by Theorems 3.1 and 3.2.
In Figure 1, we show the empirical probabilities of the
connectivity of G (represented by lines) and G˜ (represented
by symbols). We observe that the empirical probabilities are
almost identical, supporting the claim that the on/off channel
model serves as a good approximation of the disk model
under the given matching condition. Furthermore, we show the
critical threshold of connectivity predicted by Theorem 3.2 by
a vertical dashed line for each curve. More specifically, for
a given α, the vertical dashed lines stand for the minimum
integer value of K1 that satisfies
λ1(n)=
2∑
j=1
µj
(
1−
(
P−Kj
K1
)(
P
K1
) ) > 1
α
logn
n
(14)
According to Theorem 3.2, at this critical value of K1 the
network would be connected with probability 1 as the number
of nodes tends to infinity. We see from Figure 1 that even
in the finite-node regime (n = 500), the critical value of K1
results in a connected network with high probability.
Figure 2 is generated in a similar manner with Figure 1,
this time with an eye towards understanding the impact of the
minimum key ring sizeK1 on network connectivity. We fix the
number of classes at 2 with µ = {0.5, 0.5} and consider four
different key ring sizes K each with mean 40; we consider
K = {10, 70}, K = {20, 50}, K = {30, 50}, and K =
{40, 40}. We compare the probability of connectivity in the
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Fig. 1. Empirical probability that G and G˜ are connected as a function of K
for α = piρ2 = 0.2, α = piρ2 = 0.4, α = piρ2 = 0.6, and α = piρ2 = 0.8
with n = 500 and P = 104; in each case, the empirical probability value is
obtained by averaging over 800 experiments. Vertical dashed lines stand for
the critical threshold of connectivity asserted by Theorem 3.2.
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Fig. 2. Empirical probability that G and G˜ are connected as a function of α
and piρ2 for four choices of K = (K1,K2), each with the same mean.
resulting networks as α (respectively, πρ2) varies from zero
to one. Although the average number of keys per sensor is
kept constant in all four cases, network connectivity improves
dramatically as the minimum key ring size K1 increases; e.g.,
with α = πρ2 = 0.2, the probability of connectivity is one
when K1 = K2 = 40 while it drops to zero if we set K1 = 10
and K2 = 70 so that the mean key ring size is still 40. This
confirms the observations made via Corollary 3.3.
5. OTHER APPLICATION AREAS: THE SPREAD OF
EPIDEMICS AND INFORMATION IN REAL-WORLD SOCIAL
NETWORKS
The last decade has witnessed a tremendous advance in our
understanding of how information [25], [26], influence [27],
[28], and diseases [29], [30] propagate across the globe. A
large variety of mathematical models as well as a multitude
of data sets paved the way for precise predictions and control
of the behavior of such spreading processes on complex
networks. In particular, several generative models were pro-
posed to create networks which resemble the structure of real-
world complex networks, allowing for large-scale simulations
and precise predictions of how a spreading process would
behave in real-life. Three structural properties in particular,
the power-law degree distribution, small-world, and clustering
were shown to be prevalent in real-world social networks [31]–
[33].
The homogeneous random key graph (where all nodes
receive the same number K of objects) was shown to generate
networks that are clustered and small-world [34]. Indeed,
the inhomogeneous counterpart K(n;µ,K, P ) intrinsically
exhibits these two properties as well. In addition to that, one
can tune the parameters of K(n;µ,K, P ) to generate networks
with a power-law degree distribution similar to that observed
in real-world social networks [35]. Collectively, the inhomo-
geneous random key graph K(n;µ,K, P ) generates networks
that are small-world and have tunable degree distribution and
clustering, hence it can be considered as a useful model
for real-world social networks. In fact, the inhomogeneous
random key graph is a natural model for common-interest
social networks. A common interest relationship between two
friends manifests from their selection of common interests or
hobbies from a large pool [24]. Clearly, this can be modeled by
an inhomogeneous random key graph, where each individual
has a set of interests (possibly of different sizes) sampled from
a large pool of interests and two individuals are connected if
they happen to share an interest.
In addition, the intersection model G(n;µ,K, P, α) con-
sidered here can be useful in studying the propagation of
epidemics or information on complex networks. A simple
model for the spread of epidemics (or information) on com-
plex networks is the so called Susceptible-Infected-Recovered
(SIR) model. Therein, a disease is transmitted to a susceptible
individual upon contact with an infected individual. Later
on, infected individuals recover from the disease and gain
immunity from it. The outbreak size is precisely the number
of recovered individuals at the steady state. This model re-
sults in reasonable predictions for the cases where recovery
grants lasting resistance. In [30], it was shown that under
some conditions, the dynamics of the SIR model on a given
network maps to a bond-percolation problem with the average
transmissibility of the disease as the percolation parameter.
Namely, with α being the average transmissibility; If we are
to occupy each edge in the graph with probability α, the final
outbreak size would be the size of the cluster of vertices that
can be reached from the initial infected vertex by traversing
the occupied edges only [30]. Typically, one is interested in
deriving the threshold value of α for which a giant connected
component emerges, indicating that the disease has reached a
positive fraction of the population.
Intersecting the inhomogeneous random key graph
K(n;µ,K, P ) with an ER graph H(n;α) is essentially
equivalent to occupying each edge of K(n;µ,K, P )
independently with probability α. Hence, the scaling
condition for which the one-law of Theorem 3.2 holds
gives us a threshold value of α for which a strain of a
disease or a piece of information would infect the entire
population. In particular, let αˆn := logn/(nλ1(n)); if the
average transmissibility of a disease α satisfies αn > αˆn,
a single giant component containing all of the vertices
emerge (because in this case the network is connected by
virtue of Theorem 3.2), allowing the disease to infect each
single vertex. Therefore, our results on the connectivity
7of G(n;µ,K, P, α) provide a threshold on the average
transmissibility a disease should have (possibly through
evolution) in order to persist in a given population modeled
by the inhomogeneous random key graph.
6. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
A. Preliminaries
Few technical results are collected here for convenience.
A full list of preliminaries is given in Appendix A. The first
result follows easily from the scaling condition (6).
Proposition 6.1 ([8, Proposition 4.1]). For any scaling
K1,K2, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 , we have (in view of (6))
λ1(n) ≤ λ2(n) ≤ . . . ≤ λr(n) (15)
for each n = 2, 3, . . ..
Another useful bound that will be used throughout is
(1 ± x) ≤ e±x, x ∈ (0, 1) (16)
Finally, we find it useful to write
log(1− x) = −x−Ψ(x) (17)
where Ψ(x) =
∫ x
0
t
1−t dt. From L’Hoˆpital’s Rule, we have
lim
x→0
Ψ(x)
x2
=
−x− log(1 − x)
x2
=
1
2
. (18)
B. Establishing the one-law
The proof of Theorem 3.1 relies on the method of first and
second moments applied to the number of isolated nodes in
G(n;µ,Θn). Let In(µ,Θn) denote the total number of isolated
nodes in G(n;µ,Θn), namely,
In(µ,Θn) =
n∑
ℓ=1
1[vℓ is isolated in G(n;µ,Θn)] (19)
The method of first moment [36, Eqn. (3.10), p. 55] gives
1− E[In(µ,Θn)] ≤ P[In(µ,Θn) = 0]
It is clear that in order to establish the one-law, namely that
limn→∞ P [In(µ,Θn) = 0] = 1, we need to show that
lim
n→∞
E[In(µ,Θn)] = 0. (20)
Recalling (19), we have
E [In(µ,Θn)]
= n
r∑
i=1
µiP [v1 is isolated in G(n;µ,Θn) | t1 = i]
= n
r∑
i=1
µiP
[∩nj=2[vj ≁ v1] | v1 is class i]
= n
r∑
i=1
µi (P [v2 ≁ v1 | v1 is class i])n−1 (21)
where (21) follows by the independence of the rvs {vj ≁
v1}nj=1 given Σ1. By conditioning on the class of v2, we find
P[v2 ≁ v1 | t1 = i] =
r∑
j=1
µjP[v2 ≁ v1 | t1 = i, t2 = j]
=
r∑
j=1
µj(1− αpij) = 1− Λi (22)
Using (22) in (21), and recalling (15) and (16), we obtain
E[In(µ,Θn)] = n
r∑
i=1
µi (1− Λi(n))n−1
≤ n (1− Λ1(n))n−1 ≤ elogn(1−cn
n−1
n ).
Taking the limit as n goes to infinity, we immediately get (20)
since limn→∞(1 − cn n−1n ) = 1 − c < 0 under the enforced
assumptions (with c > 1) and the one-law is established.
C. Establishing the zero-law
Our approach in establishing the zero-law relies on the
method of second moment applied to a variable that counts
the number of nodes that are class-1 and isolated. Clearly if
we can show that whp there exists at least one class-1 node
that is isolated under the enforced assumptions (with c < 1)
then the zero-law would immediately follow.
Let Yn(µ,Θn) denote the number of nodes that are class-1
and isolated in G(n;µ,Θn), and let
xn,i(µ,Θn) = 1[ti = 1 ∩ vi is isolated in G(n;µ,Θn)],
then we have Yn(µ,Θn) =
∑n
i=1 xn,i(µ,Θn). By applying
the method of second moments [36, Remark 3.1, p. 55] on
Yn(µ,Θn), we get
P[Yn(µ,Θn) = 0] ≤ 1− E[Yn(µ,Θn)]
2
E[Yn(µ,Θn)2]
(23)
where
E[Yn(µ,Θn)] = nE[xn,1(µ,Θn)] (24)
and
E[Yn(µ,Θn)
2] =nE[xn,1(µ,Θn)] (25)
+ n(n− 1)E[xn,1(µ,Θn)xn,2(µ,Θn)]
by exchangeability and the binary nature of the rvs
{xn,i(µ,Θn)}ni=1. Using (24) and (25), we get
E[Yn(µ,Θn)
2]
E[Yn(µ,Θn)]2
=
1
nE[xn,1(µ,Θn)]
+
n− 1
n
E[xn,1(µ,Θn)xn,2(µ,Θn)]
E[xn,1(µ,Θn)]2
In order to establish the zero-law, we need to show that
lim
n→∞
nE[xn,1(µ,Θn)] =∞, (26)
and
lim sup
n→∞
(
E[xn,1(µ,Θn)xn,2(µ,Θn)]
E[xn,1(µ,Θn)]2
)
≤ 1. (27)
Proposition 6.2. Consider a scaling K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 →
N
r+1
0 and a scaling α : N0 → (0, 1) such that (7) holds with
limn→∞ cn = c > 0. Then, we have
lim
n→∞
nE[xn,1(µ,Θn)] =∞, if c < 1
Proof. We have
nE [xn,1(µ,Θn)]
8= nP [v1 is isolated in G(n;µ,Θn) ∩ t1 = 1]
= nµ1P
[∩nj=2[vj ≁ v1] | t1 = 1]
= nµ1P [v2 ≁ v1 | t1 = 1]n−1
= nµ1
 r∑
j=1
µjP [v2 ≁ v1 | t1 = 1, t2 = j]
n−1
= nµ1
 r∑
j=1
µj(1 − αnp1j)
n−1 (28)
= nµ1 (1− Λ1(n))n−1 = µ1eβn (29)
where βn = logn + (n − 1) log(1 − Λ1(n)). Recalling (17),
we get
βn = logn− (n− 1) (Λ1(n) + Ψ(Λ1(n)))
= logn− (n− 1)
(
cn
logn
n
+Ψ
(
cn
logn
n
))
= logn
(
1− cn n− 1
n
)
− (n− 1)
(
cn
logn
n
)2 Ψ(cn lognn )(
cn
logn
n
)2 (30)
Recalling (18), we have
lim
n→∞
Ψ
(
cn
logn
n
)
(
cn
log n
n
)2 = 12 (31)
since cn
logn
n = o(1). Thus, βn = logn
(
1− cn n−1n
) − o(1).
Using (29), (30), (31), and letting n go to infinity, we get
lim
n→∞
nE[xn,1(µ,Θn)] =∞
whenever limn→∞ cn = c < 1. 
Proposition 6.3. Consider a scaling K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 →
N
r+1
0 and a scaling α : N0 → (0, 1) such that (7) holds with
limn→∞ cn = c > 0. Then, we have (27) if c < 1.
The proof of Proposition 6.3 is given in Appendix C.
Collectively, Proposition 6.2 and Proposition 6.3 establish (26)
and (27) respectively, which in turn establish the zero-law of
Theorem 3.1.
7. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2
Let Cn(µ,Θn) denote the event that the graph G(n,µ,Θn)
is connected, and with a slight abuse of notation, let In(µ,Θn)
denote the event that the graph G(n,µ,Θn) has no isolated
nodes. It is clear that if a random graph is connected then it
does not have any isolated node, hence
Cn(µ,Θn) ⊆ In(µ,Θn)
and we get
P[Cn(µ,Θn)] ≤ P[In(µ,Θn)] (32)
and
P[Cn(µ,Θn)
c] = P[In(µ,Θn)
c] + P[Cn(µ,Θn)
c ∩ In(µ,Θn)].
(33)
In view of (32), we obtain the zero-law for connectivity,
i.e., that
lim
n→∞
P[G(n;µ,Θn) is connected] = 0 if c < 1,
immediately from the zero-law part of Theorem 3.1, i.e., from
that limn→∞ P[In(µ,Θn)] = 0 if c < 1. It remains to establish
the one-law for connectivity. In the remainder of this section,
we assume that (7) holds for some c > 1. From Theorem 3.1
and (33), we see that the one-law for connectivity, i.e., that
lim
n→∞
P[G(n;µ,Θn) is connected] = 1 if c > 1,
will follow if we show that
lim
n→∞
P[Cn(µ,Θn)
c ∩ In(µ,Θn)] = 0. (34)
Our approach will be to find a suitable upper bound for (34)
and prove that it goes to zero as n goes to infinity with c > 1.
We now work towards deriving an upper bound for (34);
then in Appendix E we will show that the bound goes to zero
as n gets large. Define the event En(µ,θ,X ) via
En(µ,θ,X ) := ∪S⊆N :|S|≥1
[|∪i∈SΣi|≤ X|S|]
where N = {1, . . . , n} and X = [X1 · · · Xn] is an n-
dimensional array of integers. Let
Ln := min
(⌊
P
K1
⌋
,
⌊n
2
⌋)
(35)
and
Xℓ =
{
⌊βℓK1⌋ ℓ = 1, . . . , Ln
⌊γP⌋ ℓ = Ln + 1, . . . , n
(36)
for some β and γ in (0, 12 ) that will be specified later. In words,
En(µ,θ,X ) denotes the event that there exists ℓ = 1, . . . , n
such that the number of unique keys stored by at least one
subset of ℓ sensors is less than ⌊βℓK1⌋1[ℓ ≤ Ln]+⌊γP⌋1[ℓ >
Ln]. Using a crude bound, we get
P[Cn(µ,Θn)
c ∩ In(µ,Θn)]
≤ P[En(µ,θn,Xn)]
+ P[Cn(µ,Θn)
c ∩ In(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c] (37)
Thus, (34) will be established by showing that
lim
n→∞
P[En(µ,θn,Xn)] = 0, (38)
and
lim
n→∞
P[Cn(µ,Θn)
c∩In(µ,Θn)∩En(µ,θn,Xn)c] = 0 (39)
Proposition 7.1. Consider scalings K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 →
N
r+1
0 and α : N0 → (0, 1) such that (7) holds for some c >
1, (11) and (12) hold. Then, we have (38) where Xn is as
specified in (36), β ∈ (0, 12 ) and γ ∈ (0, 12 ) are selected such
that
max
(
2βσ, β
(
e2
σ
) β
1−2β
)
< 1 (40)
max
(
2
(√
γ
(
e
γ
)γ)σ
,
√
γ
(
e
γ
)γ)
< 1 (41)
9Proof. The proof is similar to [8, Proposition 7.2]. Results
only require conditions (11) and K1,n = ω(1) to hold. The
latter condition is clearly established in Lemma A.4. 
The rest of the paper is devoted to establishing (39) under
the enforced assumptions on the scalings and with Xn as
specified in (36), β ∈ (0, 12 ) selected small enough such
that (40) holds, and γ ∈ (0, 12 ) selected small enough such
that (41) holds. We denote by G(n,µ,Θn)(S) a subgraph of
G(n,µ,Θn) whose vertices are restricted to the set S. Define
the events
Cn(µ,Θn, S) := [G(n,µ,Θn)(S) is connected]
Bn(µ,Θn, S) := [G(n,µ,Θn)(S) is isolated]
An(µ,Θn, S) := Cn(µ,Θn, S) ∩Bn(µ,Θn, S)
In other words, An(µ,Θn, S) encodes the event that
G(n,µ,Θn)(S) is a component, i.e., a connected subgraph
that is isolated from the rest of the graph. The key observation
is that a graph is not connected if and only if it has a
component on vertices S with 1 ≤ |S|≤ ⌊n2 ⌋; note that if
vertices S form a component then so do vertices N − S. The
event In(µ,Θn) eliminates the possibility of G(n,µ,Θn)(S)
containing a component of size one (i.e., an isolated node),
whence we have
Cn(µ,Θn)
c ∩ In(µ,Θn) ⊆ ∪S∈N :2≤|S|≤⌊n2 ⌋An(µ,Θn, S)
and the conclusion
P[Cn(µ,Θn)
c∩In(µ,Θn)] ≤
∑
S∈N :2≤|S|≤⌊n2 ⌋
P[An(µ,Θn, S)]
follows. By exchangeability, we get
P[Cn(µ,Θn)
c ∩ In(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c]
≤
⌊n2 ⌋∑
ℓ=2
 ∑
S∈Nn,ℓ
P[An(µ,Θn, S) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c]

=
⌊n2 ⌋∑
ℓ=2
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩En(µ,θn,Xn)c] (42)
where Nn,ℓ denotes the collection of all subsets of {1, . . . , n}
with exactly ℓ elements, and An,ℓ(µ,Θn) denotes the event
that the set {1, . . . , ℓ} of nodes form a component. As before
we have An,ℓ(µ,Θn) = Cℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ Bn,ℓ(µ,Θn), where
Cℓ(µ,Θn) denotes the event that {1, . . . , ℓ} is connected and
Bn,ℓ(µ,Θn) denotes the event that {1, . . . , ℓ} is isolated from
the rest of the graph.
Next, with ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, define νℓ,j(α) by
νℓ,j(α) := {i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ : Bij(α) = 1} (43)
for each j = ℓ+1, . . . , n. Namely, νℓ,j(α) is the set of nodes
in {v1, . . . , vℓ} that are adjacent to node vj in the ER graph
H(n;αn). For each ℓ = 1, . . . , n− 1, we have
Bn,ℓ(µ,Θn) =
n⋂
m=ℓ+1
[(∪i∈νℓ,m(αn)Σi) ∩Σm = ∅] .
We have
P [Bn,ℓ(µ,Θn) | Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ]
= E
 n∏
m=ℓ+1
(P−|∪i∈νℓ,m(αn)Σi|
|Σm|
)
(
P
|Σm|
) ∣∣∣∣ Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ

=
n∏
m=ℓ+1
E
(P−|∪i∈νℓ,m(αn)Σi||Σm| )(
P
|Σm|
) ∣∣∣∣ Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ

= E
(P−|∪i∈νℓ(αn)Σi||Σ| )(
P
|Σ|
) ∣∣∣∣ Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ
n−ℓ (44)
noting the fact that the collection of rvs {νℓ,m,Σm : m = ℓ+
1, . . . , n} are mutually independent and identically distributed.
Here, νℓ(αn) denotes a generic rv distributed identically with
νℓ,m(αn) for any m = ℓ + 1, . . . , n. Similarly, |Σ| denotes a
rv that takes the value Kj with probability µj .
We will leverage the expression (44) in (42) in the following
manner. Note that on the event En(µ,θn,Xn)
c, we have∣∣∪i∈νℓ(αn)Σi∣∣ ≥ (Xn,νℓ(αn) + 1)1[|νℓ(αn)| > 0] (45)
while the crude bound∣∣∪i∈νℓ(αn)Σi∣∣ ≥ K1,n1[|νℓ(αn)| > 0] (46)
always holds. These bounds lead to
P [Bn,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c | Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ]
≤ E
(P−max(K1,n,Xn,νℓ(αn)+1)1[|νℓ(αn)|>0]|Σ| )(
P
|Σ|
)
n−ℓ (47)
Conditioning on Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ and {Bij(αn), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ ℓ},
we then get
P [An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c]
= E [1 [Cℓ(µ,Θn)]1 [Bn,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c]]
≤ E
[
1[Cℓ(µ,Θn)]·
· E
(P−max(K1,n,Xn,νℓ(αn)+1)1[|νℓ(αn)|>0]|Σ| )(
P
|Σ|
)
]n−ℓ
= P[Cℓ(µ,Θn)]E
(P−max(K1,n,Xn,νℓ(αn)+1)1[|νℓ(αn)|>0]|Σ| )(
P
|Σ|
)
n−ℓ
(48)
since Cℓ(µ,Θn) is fully determined by Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ and
{Bij(αn), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ ℓ}, and Bn,ℓ(µ,Θn) and
En(µ,θn,Xn) are independent from {Bij(αn), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ ℓ}.
The next result establishes bounds for both terms at (48).
Lemma 7.2. Consider a distribution µ = (µ1, µ2, . . . , µr),
integers K1 ≤ · · · ≤ Kr ≤ P/2, and α ∈ (0, 1). With Xn as
specified in (36), β ∈ (0, 12 ) and γ ∈ (0, 12 ), we have
P[Cℓ(µ,Θ)] ≤ min
{
1, ℓℓ−2 (αprr)
ℓ−1
}
(49)
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and
E
(P−max(K1,Xn,νℓ(α)+1)1[|νℓ(α)|>0]|Σ| )(
P
|Σ|
)
 ≤ min{1− αλ1,
min{1− µr + µre−αp1rβℓ, e−αp11βℓ}+ e−γK11[ℓ > Ln]
}
(50)
The proof of Lemma 7.2 is given in Appendix D.
Our proof of (39) will be completed (see (42)) upon
establishing
lim
n→∞
⌊n2 ⌋∑
ℓ=2
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c] = 0 (51)
by means of (48), (49), and (50). These steps are taken in
Appendix E. This establishes the one-law.
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APPENDIX A
PRELIMINARIES
Lemma A.1 ([8, Lemma 4.2]). Consider any scaling
K1,K2, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 . For any i, j = 1, . . . , r,
lim
n→∞
pij(n) = 0 if and only if lim
n→∞
Ki,nKj,n
Pn
= 0
and we have the asymptotic equivalence
pij(n) ∼ Ki,nKj,n
Pn
. (A.1)
Proposition A.2 ([8, Proposition 4.4]). For any set of positive
integers K1, . . . ,Kr, P and any scalar a ≥ 1, we have(
P−⌈aKi⌉
Kj
)(
P
Kj
) ≤ ((P−KiKj )(
P
Kj
) )a , i, j = 1, . . . , r. (A.2)
Lemma A.3. Consider a scaling K1,K2, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 →
N
r+1
0 such that (7) holds. We have
cn
logn
nαn
≤ p1r(n) ≤ cn
µr
logn
nαn
(A.3)
If in addition (12) holds, we have
prr(n) = o
(
(log n)2
nαn
)
. (A.4)
A proof of Lemma A.3 is given in Appendix B.
Lemma A.4. Under (12), we have
K21,n
Pn
= ω
(
1
nαn
)
, (A.5)
and
K1,n = ω(1). (A.6)
Proof. It is a simple matter to check that p11(n) ≤ K
2
1,n
Pn−K1,n
;
see [14, Proposition 7.1-7.2] for a proof. In view of (6) this
gives p11(n) ≤ 2K
2
1,n
Pn
. Thus, we have
K21,n
Pn
= Ω(p11(n)) = ω
(
1
nαn
)
.
From (11), (A.5), and αn ≤ 1, we readily obtain (A.6).
Other useful bounds that will be used throughout are(
n
ℓ
)
≤
(en
ℓ
)ℓ
, ℓ = 1, . . . , n, n = 1, 2, . . . (A.7)
⌊n2 ⌋∑
ℓ=2
(
n
ℓ
)
≤ 2n (A.8)
APPENDIX B
A PROOF OF LEMMA A.3
We know from (9) that
λ1(n) =
r∑
j=1
µjp1j = cn
logn
αnn
.
Since p1j is monotone increasing in j = 1, . . . , r by virtue of
(15), we readily obtain the bounds
cn
logn
nαn
≤ p1r(n) ≤ cn
µr
log n
nαn
(B.9)
which establishes (A.3).
In view of (B.9) that implies p1r(n) = Θ(
logn
αnn
), we will
obtain (A.4) if we show that prr(n) = o(logn)p1r(n). Here
this will be established by showing that
prr(n) ≤ max
(
2,
8cn
µr
logn
wn
)
p1r(n), n = 2, 3, . . .
(B.10)
for some sequence wn such that limn→∞ wn = ∞. Fix n =
2, 3, . . . . We have either p1r(n) >
1
2 , or p1r(n) ≤ 12 . In the
former case, it automatically holds that
prr(n) ≤ 2p1r(n) (B.11)
by virtue of the fact that prr(n) ≤ 1.
Assume now that p1r(n) ≤ 12 . We know from [14, Lem-
mas 7.1-7.2] that
1− e−
Kj,nKr,n
Pn ≤ pjr(n) ≤ Kj,nKr,n
Pn −Kj,n , j = 1, . . . , r
(B.12)
and it follows that
K1,nKr,n
Pn
≤ log
(
1
1− p1r(n)
)
≤ log 2 < 1. (B.13)
Using the fact that 1− e−x ≥ x2 with x in (0, 1), we then get
p1r(n) ≥ K1,nKr,n
2Pn
. (B.14)
In addition, using the upper bound in (B.12) with j = r gives
prr(n) ≤
K2r,n
Pn −Kr,n ≤ 2
K2r,n
Pn
as we invoke (6). Combining the last two bounds we obtain
prr(n)
p1r(n)
≤ 4Kr,n
K1,n
(B.15)
In order to bound the term Kr,n/K1,n, we recall from
Lemma A.4 that (12) implies (A.5), i.e., that
K21,n
Pn
= wnnαn ,
for some sequence wn satisfying limn→∞ wn = ∞. Using
this together with (B.14) and (B.9) we then get
Kr,n
K1,n
=
K1,nKr,n
Pn
K21,n
Pn
≤ 2p1r(n)wn
nαn
≤
2 cnµr
logn
nαn
wn
nαn
=
2cn
µr
logn
wn
Reporting this into (B.15) we get
prr(n) ≤ 8cn
µr
logn
wn
p1r(n). (B.16)
Combining (B.11) and (B.16), we readily obtain (B.10).
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6.3
Consider fixed Θ.
E [xn,1(µ,Θ)xn,2(µ,Θ)]
= E [1[v1 is isolated , v2 is isolated ∩ t1 = 1, t2 = 1]]
= µ21E
[
1[v1 is isolated , v2 is isolated]
∣∣∣ t1 = 1, t2 = 1]
= µ21E
[
1[v1 ≁ v2]
n∏
m=3
1[vm ≁ v1, vm ≁ v2]
∣∣∣∣∣ t1 = t2 = 1
]
Now we condition on Σ1 and Σ2 and note that i) Σ1 and
Σ2 determine t1 and t2; and ii) the events [v1 ≁ v2], {[vm ≁
v1 ∩ vm ≁ v2]}nm=3 are mutually independent given Σ1 and
Σ2. Thus, we have
E[xn,1(µ,Θ)xn,2(µ,Θ)]
= µ21E
[
P
[
v1 ≁ v2
∣∣∣ Σ1,Σ2] · (C.17)
n∏
m=3
P
[
vm ≁ v1 ∩ vm ≁ v2
∣∣∣ Σ1,Σ2] ∣∣∣∣ t1 = t2 = 1]
Define the {0, 1}-valued rv u(θ) by
u(θ) := 1[Σ1 ∩ Σ2 6= ∅]. (C.18)
Recalling (43), (C.17) gives
E[xn,1(µ,Θ)xn,2(µ,Θ)]
= µ21E
[
(1 − α)u(θ)
n∏
m=3
(P−∣∣∣∪i∈ν2,m(α)Σi∣∣∣
|Σm|
)
(
P
|Σm|
) ∣∣∣∣∣ t1 = t2 = 1
]
Conditioned on u(θ) = 0 and v1, v2 being class-1, we have∣∣∪i∈ν2,m(α)Σi∣∣ = |ν2,m(α)|K1.
Also, we have
P[u(θn) = 0 | t1 = t2 = 1] = 1− p11.
Thus, we get
E[xn,1(µ,Θ)xn,2(µ,Θ) 1[u(θ) = 0]]
= µ21(1− p11)E
 n∏
m=3
(P−|ν2,m(α)K1|
|Σm|
)(
P
|Σm|
)

= µ21(1− p11)E
(P−|ν2,3(α)|K1|Σ3| )(
P
|Σ3|
)
n−2
= µ21(1− p11)
 r∑
j=1
µjE
(P−|ν2,3(α)|K1|Σ3| )(
P
|Σ3|
) ∣∣∣∣ t3 = j
n−2
= µ21(1− p11)
 r∑
j=1
µjE
[(P−|ν2,3(α)|K1
Kj
)(
P
Kj
) ]
n−2
≤ µ21(1− p11)E
 r∑
j=1
µj
((P−K1
Kj
)(
P
Kj
) )|ν2,3(α)|
n−2
where we use (A.2) in the last step.
Now, let Z(θ) denote a rv that takes the value(
P−K1
Kj
)(
P
Kj
) with probability µj , j = 1, . . . , r. (C.19)
In other words, Z(θ) = 1 − p1j with probability µj so that
E[Z(θ)] = 1− λ1. Then,
E[xn,1(µ,Θ)xn,2(µ,Θ)1 [u(θ) = 0]]
≤ µ21(1− p11)E
[
Z(θ)|ν2,3(α)|
]n−2
(C.20)
Under the independent on/off channel model, we have that
|ν2,3(α)| is a Binomial rv, i.e., |ν2,3(α)|=st Bin(2, α). Hence,
µ21(1− p11)E
[
Z(θ)|ν2,3(α)|
]n−2
(C.21)
= E
[
2∑
i=0
(
2
i
)
αi(1− α)2−iZ(θ)i
]n−2
= µ21(1− p11)E
[
(1− α)2 + 2α(1− α)Z(θ) + α2Z(θ)2]n−2
Conditioning on u(θ) = 1 and t1 = t2 = 1, we have
|∪i∈ν2,m(α)Σi| =

0 if |ν2,m(α)|= 0
K1 if |ν2,m(α)|= 1
2K1 − |Σ1 ∩ Σ2| if |ν2,m(α)|= 2
and by a crude bounding argument, we have
|∪i∈ν2,m(α)Σi|≥ K11[|ν2,m(α)|> 0] (C.22)
Using (C.22) and recalling the analysis for
E[xn,1(µ,Θ)xn,2(µ,Θ)1[u(θ) = 0]], we obtain
E[xn,1(µ,Θ)xn,2(µ,Θ)1[u(θ) = 1]]
≤ µ21p11(1− α)E
[
Z(θ)1[|ν2,3(α)|>0]
]n−2
= µ21p11(1− α)E
[
(1− α)2 + (1− (1 − α)2)Zn]n−2
(C.23)
Combining (C.20), (C.21), and (C.23), we get
E[xn,1(µ,Θ)xn,2(µ,Θ)]
= E[xn,1(µ,Θ)xn,2(µ,Θ) (1[u(θ) = 0] + 1[u(θ) = 1])]
≤ µ21(1− p11)
(
(1 − α)2 + 2α(1− α)E[Z(θ)]
+ α2E
[
Z(θ)2
] )n−2
+ µ21p11(1− α)
(
(1 − α)2
+
(
1− (1− α)2)E[Z(θ)])n−2 (C.24)
It is clear from (28) and the definition of Z(θ) that
E[xn,1(µ,Θ)] = µ1
 r∑
j=1
µj(1 − αp1j)
n−1
= µ1 ((1− α) + αE [Z(θ)])n−1 (C.25)
Combining (C.24) and (C.25), we get
E[xn,1(µ,Θ)xn,2(µ,Θ)]
E[xn,1(θ)]2
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≤ (1− p11)
(
(1 − α)2 + 2α(1− α)E[Z(θ)] + α2E[Z(θ)2])n−2
((1− α) + αE [Z(θ)])2(n−1)
+ p11
(
(1− α)2 + (1− (1 − α)2)E[Z(θ)])n−2
((1− α) + αE [Z(θ)])2(n−1)
:= A+B (C.26)
where we use the fact that 1− α ≤ 1.
We now consider a scalingΘ : N0 → Nr+10 ×(0, 1) as stated
in Proposition 6.3 and bound the terms A and B in turn. Our
goal is to show that
lim sup
n→∞
(A+B) ≤ 1. (C.27)
First, we write E[Z(θn)
2] = E[Z(θn)]
2 + var[Z(θn)], where
var[Z(θn)] can be bounded by the Popoviciu’s inequality [37,
p. 9] as follows
var[Z(θn)] ≤ 1
4
(max(Z(θn))−min(Z(θn)))2
=
1
4
((Pn−K1,n
K1,n
)(
Pn
K1,n
) − (Pn−K1,nKr,n )(
Pn
Kr,n
) )2
≤ 1
4
(
1−
(
Pn−K1,n
Kr,n
)(
Pn
Kr,n
) )2 = 1
4
(p1r(n))
2 .
Then, we get from the scaling condition (9) and (B.9) that
E[Z(θn)
2] ≤ E[Z(θn)]2 + 1
4
(
cn
µr
log n
nαn
)2
Reporting this into (C.26) we get
A ≤ (1− p11)
(
((1− αn) + αnE[Z(θn)])2 +
(
cn
2µr
logn
n
)2)n−2
((1 − αn) + αnE [Z(θn)])2(n−1)
= (1 + o(1))(1 − p11)
1 +( cn2µr lognn
1− αn + αnE [Z(θn]
)2n−2
where we used the fact that
((1− αn) + αnE[Z(θn)])2 = (1− αnλ1(n))2 = 1− o(1)
(C.28)
since αnλ1(n) = cn logn/n. Finally, we have1 +( cn2µr lognn
1− αn + αnE [Z(θn]
)2n−2
≤ exp
n
(
cn
2µr
logn
n
1− cn log nn
)2 = o(1)
since limn→∞ cn = c > 0 and µr > 0. Thus, we obtain the
bound
A ≤ (1− p11) (1 + o(1)) . (C.29)
We now consider the second term in (C.26). Recall (C.28)
and that E [Z(θn)] = 1− λ1(n) = 1− cn logn/n. We have
B =
p11
(1− αn + αnE [Z(θn)])2
·
·
(
1 +
α2nE[Z(θn)](1− E[Z(θn)])
(1− αn + αnE [Z(θn)])2
)n−2
≤ p11(1 + o(1)) exp
{
n
α2ncn
logn
nαn
(1 − cn lognnαn )
(1− cn lognn )2
}
≤ p11(1 + o(1)) exp
 cnαn logn(1− cn log nn )2
 (C.30)
We will now establish the desired result (C.27) by using
(C.29) and (C.30). Our approach is based on the subsub-
sequence principle [36, p. 12] and considering the cases
limn→∞ αn logn = 0 and limn→∞ αn logn ∈ (0,∞] sep-
arately.
a) Assume that limn→∞ αn logn = 0: From (C.30) we
get B ≤ (1 + o(1))p11 and upon using (C.29) we see that
A + B ≤ (1 + o(1)) establishing (C.27) along subsequences
with limn→∞ αn logn = 0.
b) Assume that limn→∞ αn logn ∈ (0,∞]: Since p1j is
monotonically increasing in j = 1, . . . , r (see (15)), we have
λ1 =
r∑
j=1
µjp1j ≥ p11
r∑
j=1
µj = p11
Thus, p11 ≤ λ1(n) = cn logn/(αnn). Then, (C.30) gives
B ≤ (1 + o(1)) cn logn
αnn
exp
{
cnαn logn
(1− cnlogn/n)2
}
= (1 + o(1))
cn(logn)
2
αn logn
n
−1+ cnαn
(1−cnlog n/n)2
= o(1)
since limn→∞ αn logn > 0 along this subsequence and
lim
n→∞
−1 + cnαn
(1− cn logn/n)2
< 0
given that limn→∞ cn = c < 1. From (C.29) and the fact that
p11 ≤ 1, we have A ≤ 1 + o(1), and (C.27) follows.
The two cases considered cover all the possibilities for the
limit of αn logn. By virtue of the subsubsequence principle
[36, p. 12], we get (C.27) without any condition on the
sequence αn logn; i.e., we obtain (C.27) even when the
sequence αn logn does not have a limit!
APPENDIX D
ESTABLISHING LEMMA 7.2
The bounds given at Lemma 7.2 are valid irrespective of
how the parameters involved scale with n. Thus, we consider
fixed Θ with constraints given in the statement of Lemma 7.2.
We first establish (50) starting with the first bound. Recall
that |νℓ(α)| is a Binomial rv with ℓ trials and success prob-
ability α. Recall also the rv Z(θ) defined at (C.19). Using a
crude bound and then (A.2) we get
E
(P−max(K1,Xn,νℓ(α)+1)1[|νℓ(α)|>0]|Σ| )(
P
|Σ|
)

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≤ E
(P−K11[|νℓ(α)|>0]|Σ| )(
P
|Σ|
)

≤ E
[
Z(θ)1[|νℓ(α)|>0]
]
= (1− α)ℓ +
(
1− (1− α)ℓ
)
E[Z(θ)]
≤ 1− α+ αE [Z(θ)] = 1− αλ1(n). (D.31)
upon noting that E [Z(θ)] = 1− λ1 ≤ 1.
Next, consider range ℓ = 1, . . . , Ln, where we have(
Xn,νℓ(α) + 1
)
1[|νℓ(α)| > 0] ≥ ⌈β |νℓ(α)|K1⌉
Recalling (A.2), we get
E
(P−max(K1,Xn,νℓ(α)+1)1[|νℓ(α)|>0]|Σ| )(
P
|Σ|
)

≤ E
[(P−β|νℓ(α)|K1
|Σ|
)(
P
|Σ|
) ]
= E
[
Z(θ)β|νℓ(α)|
]
= E
 ℓ∑
j=0
(
ℓ
j
)
αj(1− α)ℓ−jZ(θ)βj

= E
[(
1− α (1− Z(θ)β))ℓ]
≤ E
[
(1− αβ (1− Z(θ)))ℓ
]
≤ E
[
e−α(1−Z(θ))βℓ
]
(D.32)
using the fact that 1 − Z(θ)β ≥ β(1 − Z(θ)) with Z(θ) ≤ 1
and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1; a proof is available at [12, Lemma 5.2]. On
the range ℓ = Ln + 1, . . . ,
⌊
n
2
⌋
, |νℓ(α)| can be less than or
greater than Ln. In the latter case, we have
max(K1, Xn,νℓ(α) + 1)1[|νℓ(α)| > 0] ≥ ⌊γP⌋+ 1
Using (D.32) and the fact that (see [38, Lemma 5.4.1] for a
proof) (
P −K1
K2
)/(
P
K2
)
≤ e−K2P K1
for K1 +K2 ≤ P , we have
E
(P−max(K1,Xn,νℓ(α)+1)1[|νℓ(α)|>0]|Σ| )(
P
|Σ|
)

≤ E
[
e−α(1−Z(θ))βℓ1[|νℓ(α)| ≤ Ln]
]
+ E
[
e−
|Σ|
P (⌊γP⌋+1)1[|νℓ(α)| > Ln]
]
≤ E
[
e−α(1−Z(θ))βℓ
]
+ e−γK11[ℓ > Ln] (D.33)
by virtue of the fact that |Σ|≥ K1.
Finally, we get (50) from (D.31) and (D.33) by noting that
E
[
e−α(1−Z(θ))βℓ
]
=
r∑
j=1
µje
−αp1jβℓ ≤ (1 − µr) + µre−αp1rβℓ
and that
E
[
e−α(1−Z(θ))βℓ
]
=
r∑
j=1
µje
−αp1jβℓ ≤ e−αp11βℓ (D.34)
The last step used the fact that pij is monotone increasing in
both i and j.
Next, we establish (49). This is a version of a fairly standard
bound derived previously for various other random graph
models including ER graphs [18], random key graphs [14],
and random K-out graphs [13], [39]. The proof is very similar
to that of [8, Proposition 9.1] and [12, Lemma 10.2]. We give
it below for completeness.
Let Gℓ(n;µ,Θ) denote the subgraph of G(n;µ,Θ) induced
on the vertices {v1, . . . , vℓ}. Gℓ(n;µ,Θ) is connected if and
only if it contains a spanning tree; i.e., we have
Cℓ(µ,Θ) = ∪T∈Tℓ [T ⊆ Gℓ(n;µ,Θ)]
where Tℓ denotes the collection of all spanning trees on the
vertices {v1, . . . , vℓ}. Thus,
P[Cℓ(µ,Θ)] ≤
∑
T∈Tℓ
P [T ⊆ Gℓ(n;µ,Θ)] . (D.35)
Given that K1 ≤ K2 ≤ . . . ≤ Kr, the probability of T being
contained in Gℓ(n;µ,Θ) is maximized when all nodes receive
the largest possible number Kr of keys. Thus, for any T ∈ T
and distribution µ we have
P [T ⊆ Gℓ(n;µ,Θ)] ≤ P [T ⊆ Gℓ(n;µ = {0, 0, . . . , 1},Θ)]
= (αprr)
ℓ−1 (D.36)
where the last equality follows from the facts that i) a tree on
ℓ vertices contain ℓ− 1 edges, and ii) since all nodes have the
same key ring size, edges in Gℓ(n;µ = {0, 0, . . . , 1},Θ) are
pairwise independent; see [14, Lemma 9.1] and [12, Eq. 64].
We obtain (49) upon using (D.36) in (D.35) and noting by
Cayley’s formula [40] that there are ℓℓ−2 trees on ℓ vertices,
i.e., |Tℓ|= ℓℓ−2.
APPENDIX E
ESTABLISHING (51)
We will establish (51) in several steps with each step focus-
ing on a specific range of the summation over ℓ. Throughout,
we consider a scalings K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 and
α : N0 → (0, 1) such that (7) holds with c > 1, (12), and
(11) hold.
1) The case where 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ R: This range considers fixed
values of ℓ. Pick an integer R to be specified later at (E.42).
Use (7), (A.4), (A.7), (48), (49), and the first bound in (50) to
get
R∑
ℓ=2
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c]
≤
R∑
ℓ=2
(en
ℓ
)ℓ
ℓℓ−2 (αnprr(n))
ℓ−1 (1− αnλ1(n))n−ℓ
≤
R∑
ℓ=2
(en)ℓ
(
(logn)2
n
)ℓ−1(
1− cn logn
n
)n−ℓ
≤
R∑
ℓ=2
n
(
e(log n)2
)ℓ
e−cn logn
n−ℓ
n
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=
R∑
ℓ=2
(
e(logn)2
)ℓ
n1−cn
n−ℓ
n
With c > 1, we have limn→∞
(
1− cn n−ℓn
)
= 1 − c < 0.
Thus, for each ℓ = 2, 3, . . ., we have(
e(logn)2
)ℓ−1
n1−cn
n−ℓ
n = o(1),
whence we get
lim
n→∞
R∑
ℓ=2
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c] = 0.
2) The case where R+1 ≤ ℓ ≤ min{Ln, ⌊ µrnβcn logn⌋}: Our
goal in this and the next subsubsection is to cover the range
R + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ⌊ µrnβcn logn⌋. Since the bound given at (50) takes
a different form when ℓ > Ln, we first consider the range
R + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ min{Ln, ⌊ µrnβcn logn⌋}. Using (A.4), (A.7), (48),
(49), and the second bound in (50) we get
min{Ln,⌊
µrn
βcn logn
⌋}∑
ℓ=R+1
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c]
≤
min{Ln,⌊
µrn
βcn log n
⌋}∑
ℓ=R+1
(en
ℓ
)ℓ
ℓℓ−2
(
(log n)2
n
)ℓ−1
· (E.37)
·
(
1− µr
(
1− e−αnβℓp1r(n)
))n−ℓ
From the upper bound in (A.3) and ℓ ≤ µrnβcn logn , we have
αnβℓp1r(n) ≤ αnβ µrn
βcn logn
cn
µr
logn
nαn
= 1.
Using the fact that 1− e−x ≥ x2 for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, we get
1−µr
(
1− e−αnβℓp1r(n)
)
≤ 1−µrαnβℓp1r(n)
2
≤e−βℓcnµr log n2n
(E.38)
using the lower bound in (A.3). Reporting this last bound in
to (E.37) and noting that
n− ℓ ≥ n
2
, ℓ = 2, 3, . . . ,
⌊n
2
⌋
, (E.39)
we get
min{Ln,⌊ µrnβcn logn⌋}∑
ℓ=R+1
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩En(µ,θn,Xn)c]
≤
min{Ln,⌊
µrn
βcn logn
⌋}∑
ℓ=R+1
n
(
e(logn)2
)ℓ
e−βℓcnµr
logn
2n
n
2
≤ n
min{Ln,⌊
µrn
βcn logn
⌋}∑
ℓ=R+1
(
e (logn)2 e−βcn
µr
4 logn
)ℓ
≤ n
∞∑
ℓ=R+1
(
e (logn)2 e−βcn
µr
4 logn
)ℓ
(E.40)
Given that β, µr > 0 and limn→∞ cn = c > 0 we clearly
have
e (logn)2 e−βcn logn
µr
4 = o(1). (E.41)
Thus, the geometric series in (E.40) is summable, and we have
min{Ln,⌊
µrn
βcn log n
⌋}∑
ℓ=R+1
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c]
≤ (1 + o(1))n
(
e (logn)
2
e−βcn logn
µr
4
)R+1
= (1 + o(1))n1−(R+1)βcn
µr
4
(
e(logn)2
)R+1
= o(1)
for any positive integer R with
R >
8
βcµr
. (E.42)
This choice is permissible given that c, β, µr > 0.
3) The case where min{⌊ µrnβcn log n⌋,max(R,Ln)} <
ℓ ≤ ⌊ µrnβcn logn⌋: Clearly, this range becomes obsolete if
max(R,Ln) ≥ ⌊ µrnβcn logn⌋. Thus, it suffices to consider the
subsequences for which the range max(R,Ln) + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤
⌊ µrnβcn logn⌋ is non-empty. There, we use (A.4), (A.7), (48),
(49), and the second bound in (50) to get
⌊ µrnβcn logn⌋∑
ℓ=max(R,Ln)+1
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩En(µ,θn,Xn)c]
(E.43)
≤
⌊ µrnβcn log n⌋∑
ℓ=max(R,Ln)+1
(en
ℓ
)ℓ
ℓℓ−2
(
(logn)
2
n
)ℓ−1
.
(
1− µr
(
1− e−βℓαnp1r(n)
)
+ e−γK1,n
)n
2
.
≤
⌊ µrn2βc logn⌋∑
ℓ=max(R,Ln)+1
n
(
e (logn)
2
)ℓ (
e−βℓcnµr
log n
2n + e−γK1,n
)n
2
where in the last step we used (E.38) in view of ℓ ≤ µrnβcn logn .
Next, we write
e−βℓcnµr
logn
2n + e−γK1,n
= e−βℓcnµr
log n
2n
(
1 + e−γK1,n+βℓcnµr
logn
2n
)
≤ exp
{
−βℓcnµr logn
2n
+ e−γK1,n+βℓcnµr
logn
2n
}
≤ exp
−βℓcnµr logn2n
1− e−γK1,n+µ2r2
βℓcnµr
logn
2n

 (E.44)
where the last inequality is obtained from ℓ ≤ µrnβcn logn . Using
the fact that ℓ > Ln = min{⌊ PnK1,n ⌋, ⌊n2 ⌋} and (11) we have
e−γK1,n
βℓcnµr
logn
2n
≤ max
{
K1,n
Pn
,
2
n
}
2n
e−γK1,n
βcnµr logn
≤ max
{
2K1,ne
−γK1,n
βcnµrσ logn
,
4e−γK1,n
βcnµr logn
}
= o(1)
by virtue of (A.6) and the facts that β, µr , σ, cn > 0. Reporting
this into (E.44), we see that for for any ǫ > 0, there exists a
finite integer n∗(ǫ) such that(
e−βℓcnµr
logn
2n + e−γK1,n
)
≤ e−βℓcnµr logn2n (1−ǫ) (E.45)
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for all n ≥ n∗(ǫ). Using (E.45) in (E.43), we get
⌊ µrnβcn logn⌋∑
ℓ=max(R,Ln)+1
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩En(µ,θn,Xn)c]
≤ n
⌊ µrnβcn logn⌋∑
ℓ=max(R,Ln)+1
(
e (logn)
2
e−βcnµr
logn
2n (1−ǫ)
n
2
)ℓ
≤ n
∞∑
ℓ=max(R,Ln)+1
(
e (logn)
2
e−βcnµr
logn
4 (1−ǫ)
)ℓ
(E.46)
Similar to (E.41), we have e (logn)2 e−βcnµr
logn
4 (1−ǫ) = o(1)
so that the sum in (E.46) converges. Following a similar
approach to that in Section E-2, we then see that
lim
n→∞
⌊ µrn2βc logn⌋∑
ℓ=max(R,Ln)+1
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn)∩En(µ,θn,Xn)c] = 0
with R selected according to (E.42) and ǫ < 1/2.
4) The case where ⌊ µrnβcn logn⌋+1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ⌊νn⌋: We consider
⌊ µrnβcn logn⌋+1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ⌊νn⌋ for some ν ∈ (0, 12 ) to be specified
later. Recall (A.3), (A.7), (48), the first bound in (49), and the
second bound in (50). Noting that
(
n
ℓ
)
is monotone increasing
in ℓ when 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ ⌊n2 ⌋ and using (E.39) we get
⌊νn⌋∑
ℓ=⌊ µrnβcn logn ⌋+1
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c]
≤
⌊νn⌋∑
ℓ=⌊ µrnβcn logn ⌋+1
(
n
⌊νn⌋
)(
1− µr + µre−αnβℓp1r(n) + e−γK1,n
)n
2
≤
⌊νn⌋∑
ℓ=⌊ µrnβcn log n ⌋+1
( e
ν
)νn(
1− µr + µre−αnβ
µrn
βcn logn
cn logn
nαn
+e−γK1,n
)n
2
≤ n
( e
ν
)νn (
1− µr + µre−µr + e−γK1,n
)n
2
= n
(( e
ν
)2ν (
1− µr + µre−µr + e−γK1,n
))n2
(E.47)
We have 1−µr+µre−µr < 1 from µr > 0 and e−γK1,n =
o(1) from (A.6). Also, it holds that limν→0
(
e
ν
)2ν
= 1. Thus,
if we pick ν small enough to ensure that( e
ν
)2ν (
1− µr + µre−µr
)
< 1, (E.48)
then for any 0 < ǫ < 1 − (e/ν)2ν (1− µr + µre−µr) there
exists a finite integer n⋆(ǫ) such that( e
ν
)2ν (
1− µr + µre−µr + e−γK1,n
) ≤ 1−ǫ, ∀n ≥ n⋆(ǫ).
Reporting this into (E.47), we get
lim
n→∞
⌊νn⌋∑
ℓ=⌊ µrn2βc logn⌋+1
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn)∩En(µ,θn,Xn)c] = 0
since limn→∞ n(1− ǫ)n/2 = 0.
5) The case where ⌊νn⌋+ 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ⌊n2 ⌋: In this range, we
use (A.8), (48), the first bound in (49), the last bound in (50),
and (E.39) to get
⌊n2 ⌋∑
ℓ=⌊νn⌋+1
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c]
≤
⌊n2 ⌋∑
ℓ=⌊νn⌋+1
(
n
ℓ
)(
e−βℓαnp11(n) + e−γK1,n
)n
2
≤
 ⌊
n
2 ⌋∑
ℓ=⌊νn⌋+1
(
n
ℓ
)(e−βνnαnp11(n) + e−γK1,n)n2
≤
(
4e−βνnαnp11(n) + 4e−γK1,n
)n
2
With β, ν, γ > 0 have e−βνnαnp11(n) = o(1) from (12) and
e−γK1,n = o(1) from (A.6). The conclusion
lim
n→∞
⌊n2 ⌋∑
ℓ=⌊νn⌋+1
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c] = 0
immediately follows and the proof of one-law is completed.
